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A Glimpse Into the Realpolitik of 
Federal Land Planning, 
in Comparative Context With the 
Mysterious NLUPA and the CZMA
Zygmunt J.B. Plater*
I. Introduction
There is an old adage that “those who fail to plan, plan to 
fail.” Planning is a fundamentally rational, basal process 
shared at some level and to some degree by all, establishing 
and implementing frameworks to guide our human actions 
toward the accomplishment of various desired and defined 
objectives.1 Thoughtfully designed and implemented plan-
ning is no less rational and essential for governmental entities 
than it is for corporations and individuals.
This essay surveys an interesting comparison between 
two quite different federal approaches to directive land and 
resource management planning. On one hand, the analy-
sis reviews the federal mandate for layered, cooperative, 
intra-governmental land planning incorporated within the 
National Land Use Planning Act (“NLUPA”)—a statute 
repeatedly proposed in the 1970s but which never became 
law2—and within the Coastal Zone Management Act 
(“CZMA”), its sibling statute, that did.3 On the other hand, 
1. See Janet Shapiro, CIVICUS, Toolkit on Overview of Planning 1–5 
(2011), http://www.civicus.org/new/media/Overview%20of%20Planning.pdf.
2. See Lynton Keith Caldwell & Kristin Schrader-Frechette, Policy 
for Land: Law & Ethics 265 n.15 (1993), for a brief discussion of the 
origins of NLUPA.
3. See Coastal Zone Management Act § 302, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).
this essay observes the circumstances and effectiveness of fed-
eral statutory directives to federal management agencies to 
create and implement mandatory operative plans as a basis 
for resource regulatory actions on federal lands generally. 
Both of these models address the need to guide market forces 
to maximize particular defined societal objectives and to 
avoid specific public disbenefits.
Shortcomings are frequently encountered, however, in the 
implementation of many federal resource plans, visible in a 
variety of disappointing occurrences including oil spill con-
tingency responses in Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico, forestry 
management, mining, rangeland grazing, and a variety of 
other federal planning settings. Deficiencies in federal land 
and resource planning are pondered in this analysis as they 
are embodied in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
(“SUWA”).4 Underlying the dysfunctions discernible in many 
federal resource management plans is a fundamental systemic 
tension lying within the structure of modern governance. The 
analysis here finishes with a proposal for understanding how 
government currently malfunctions in the resource manage-
ment planning setting and how that can be rectified.
II. Federal and Nonfederal Land Use 
Planning: NLUPA and CZMA
A. The Elements of Planning
There is, of course, tremendous variety in the way plans are 
used throughout our society, from personal daily agendas 
and New Year’s resolutions to statutorily required govern-
mental directives for plans authorized and required to guide 
legislative policy mandates and outcomes. Plans can fall any-
where on a broad spectrum between formality and informal-
ity, between instrumentally dictating actual practices and 
mere Potemkin Village diversionary artifice.
4. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
* Professor and Coordinator of the Land & Environmental Law 
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experience in graduate study, work on resource protection planning 
for the State of Alaska’s Oil Spill Commission after the Exxon-Valdez 
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Governmental agency planning, reduced to its bare bones, 
ideally duplicates the elements incorporated within private 
planning, with the difference that it is externally as well as 
internally enforced. A number of essential elements can be 
discerned in sequence or in blended form in virtually all such 
settings where official plans are formally required:
?? definition of the area that is to be covered and the goals 
that are to be addressed—typically the initial stage, the 
role of the legislative body;
?? agency action surveying and collecting data, maps, 
charts, relevant expert research, historical data, solici-
tation and collection of relevant input from private and 
public sources, and so on;
?? formulation of potential alternative approaches that 
could be chosen, in both structure and procedure, to 
achieve the goals that have been identified;
?? evaluating and weighing the various options;
?? selecting the preferred management path, and the 
principles, enforceable standards, and procedures to 
be applied;
?? putting it all together into a coherent functional plan 
framework with a structured mechanism to apply the 
elements to guide agency actions; and
?? implementing that plan with its collection of structure, 
standards, and procedures, including monitoring ongo-
ing actions and circumstances, responsive enforcement, 
and “adaptive management” where problems arising 
or new information require ongoing amendment and 
reorganization of the plan.5
A plan, of course, is only as good as the data, standards, 
procedures, and good faith embodied in the creation and 
implementation of the plan, and each of the sequential 
stages noted can trigger a welter of controversial questions 
and debates.
B. NLUPA: A Novel and Layered Planning Structure
1. History
NLUPA, submitted three times in successive Congresses in 
the early 1970s, is now a little-remembered attempt to add an 
effective land planning statute to the parade of environmental 
protection statutes promulgated during the reign of President 
Richard Nixon.6 It is an orphan child of that decade because 
it never became law. In 1970, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jack-
son of Washington State first introduced NLUPA, in the 91st 
Congress.7 He had just previously carried the National Envi-
5. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Land Use Plan-
ning Handbook 2 (2005).
6. See John R. Nolon, The National Land Use Policy Act, 13 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 
519, 520–21 (1996).
7. See S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., Committee’s 
History, Jurisdiction, and a Summary of Its Accomplishments During 
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”)8 successfully into 
law and was interested in running for the presidency of the 
United States.9 Relishing the success of NEPA, his first-born, 
Jackson figured that the wave of environmentalism born of 
Rachel Carson and nurtured by Earth Day might continue 
to build into an unstoppable political tsunami that would 
carry him into the White House.10
Jackson decided in 1970 that his next progeny would be 
twins, two new statutes to bring rationality to the chaos of 
American land use management, federal and nonfederal. One 
of Jackson’s twin bills was focused upon federal lands—the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”)11—
which he steered through several Congresses finally to 
achieve passage in 1976.
The second of Jackson’s conceived bills, NLUPA, focused 
upon nonfederal lands. President Nixon featured the bill in 
his State of the Union address of 1971, and it passed in the 
Senate 64–21 in 1973.12 It did not get past the House of 
Representatives, however, and later that year Nixon abruptly 
backed off.13 He apparently decided that the environmen-
tal protection statutes he had signed were antagonizing 
the interests of his political base. As reported by Professor 
Flippen,14 Nixon told his Cabinet members at a meeting that 
year that it was time to “[g]et off the environment kick.”15 
NLUPA, and the memory of NLUPA, slipped into obscu-
rity. As we will see, however, the design of both NLUPA 
and CZMA embody a significant federal land planning 
model. Though they primarily address nonfederal lands, 
when viewed in the context of their structure and history, 
NLUPA and CZMA provide some relevant perspectives on 
federal land and resource management planning generally. 
NLUPA was innovative and quite promising in its design 
and structure, addressing an array of substantial problems 
arising in national patterns of land use development in the 
United States.16
Unlike virtually all other developed countries, U.S. 
national land management patterns have been almost totally 
dominated by local governmental units. State planning stat-
utes and state planning offices are typically notable for their 
absence or lack of meaningful resources and authority to 
the 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, and 91st Congresses 9–10 (Comm. Print 
1971).
8. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012).
9. See Biography, Henry M. Jackson Found., http://www.hmjackson.org/biog-
raphy (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
10. See id.
11. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012).
12. 119 Cong. Rec. S20631 (1973). NLUPA passed the Senate on June 21, 
1973. S. 268, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. 1973). It had been featured in President 
Nixon’s “Special Message to the Congress Outlining the 1972 Environmental 
Program” of February 8, 1972, where he emphasized the importance of state 
planning by saying that any state that had not established an acceptable land 
use program by 1975 would be subject to annual 7% reductions from three 
specified federal funding programs. See Letter from President Richard Nixon 
to Congress (Feb. 8, 1972), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=3731.
13. See J. Brooks Flippen, Nixon and the Environment 191 (2000).
14. See generally id.
15. Id. at 189–219.
16. Nolon, supra note 6, at 519–23.
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regulate actions in the real estate marketplace.17 There is very 
little federal government planning for nonfederal lands.18 
There were and are, however, more than 80,000 different 
local government units throughout the United States,19 vir-
tually all of them exercising control of land uses and land 
development, and virtually none coordinating with any of 
the others.
In this country, the standard pattern for land management 
is that each of the 80,000-plus units of local government, 
large or small, is insulated from its surrounding municipali-
ties.20 Each tends to operate as a hermetically isolated king-
dom, holding on to its resources and making management 
plans within the four corners of its own territory, typically 
without regard for coordinated relationship to its surround-
ing communities. The result of local dominance of land use 
patterns has become an array of problems given the nation’s 
increasing population, complexity, the intraconnectedness in 
social and economic life, and the end of the frontier.
The problems of locally dominated land management lie 
not only in the irrationality of insulated, fractionalized plan-
ning, but also in the fact that, due to development interests’ 
ability to focus expertise and economic and political pres-
sure upon local governments, marketplace political forces 
typically are able to dominate a major proportion of local 
decisionmaking.21 The most prevalent land use management 
mechanism in the nation is zoning, sometimes coupled with 
other land use mechanisms like subdivision regulation, all 
wielded at a localized level and often outgunned by the real 
estate forces that impose their preferences and resist public 
planning constraints.22
The result of local—usually weak—domination of land 
use patterns has been sprawl: the isolation of central cit-
ies from their surrounding suburban enclaves, strip cities 
along highways, and irrational distributions of utilities 
and services.23 Much or most of the nation’s current land 
development patterning has been implicitly designed on 
the assumption that most Americans always will want or 
be able to drive their cars to work, to obtain services, to go 
shopping, to enjoy recreation, and to access other necessi-
17. See, e.g., Zachary Jellson, The Community Planning Act: Market Over Planning, 
23 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 193, 195, 206 (2012) (critiquing Florida’s state-
wide land planning statute for implicitly favoring the market over regulation).
18. One notable exception is when courts have repeatedly upheld federal regu-
lation of activities on nonfederal lands which impact, or potentially impact, 
federal lands. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523 (1897) 
(holding that Congress could prohibit the construction of fences on nonfederal 
land which prevented all access to adjacent federal lands); Minnesota v. Block, 
660 F.2d 1240, 1249–51 (8th Cir. 1981) (concluding that Congress “may 
regulate conduct off federal land that interferes with the designated purpose of 
that land”).
19. The number of local governments in the United States has for decades been 
estimated at approximately 80,000; for 2012 the count was estimated at 
more than 89,000. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Re-
ports There Are 89,004 Local Governments in the United States (Aug. 30, 
2012), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/gov-
ernments/cb12-161.html.
20. See Caldwell & Shrader-Frechette, supra note 2, at 156.
21. See Sidney Plotkin, Keep Out: The Struggle for Land Use Control 
35–36 (1987).
22. See id. at 36.
23. See Phillip Weinberg, Control of Suburban Sprawl Required Regional Coordina-
tion Not Provided by Local Zoning Laws, 72 N.Y. St. B.A. J. 44, 44–45 (2000).
ties of life.24 As the world gets more complex and problem-
atic, however, and the prices of gasoline and automobiles 
rise,25 the land use premises upon which the settlement pat-
terns of the United States have long been shaped become 
increasingly irrational.
What planning design did NLUPA propose in order to 
address the increasing dysfunction of American land use pat-
terns, contradictions, duplications, waste of resources, and 
serious land use conflicts? Its proposal was a major translo-
cation in the established subsidiarity context of land man-
agement decisions for nonfederal lands in the United States, 
shifting the fulcrum of land management away from the 
local level of over 80,000 municipalities to a more coherent 
state level of 50 units.26
2. “Subsidiarity” and “Consistency” in NLUPA
“Subsidiarity” is a principle derived from both canon 
and international law27 reflected in the essential design of 
NLUPA. It is a concept for determining the appropriate 
level at which any decision is optimally to be made, and it 
incorporates a premise that decisions should be made at the 
lowest level at which they can rationally be made.28 For many 
decisions, the optimal level for decisionmaking is local—like 
relative locations of residential areas, shopping, and industry; 
segregation of conflicting uses; or internal traffic and utility 
patterns—where local participants best know a locality and 
its needs.29
The subsidiarity calculus embodied in NLUPA reflected 
the recognition that, in the United States of the 1970s, the 
local level was no longer a satisfactory locus for coordinat-
ing and handling the multiple interconnected requirements 
and challenges generated by complex modern society. By 
lifting the level of coordination up from the local to the 
state level, NLUPA attempted to make what subsidiarity 
theory would identify as a fundamentally necessary and 
rational upward reallocation of the nation’s land manage-
ment decisionmaking.30
24. See Robert G. Healy, Appropriate Levels of Government for Sustain-
able Land Use: Containing Urban Sprawl 1 (2000).
25. See Cost of Owning and Operating Vehicle in U.S. Increases Nearly Two Percent 
According to AAA’s 2013 ‘Your Driving Costs’ Study, AAA Newsroom (Apr. 
16, 2013), http://newsroom.aaa.com/2013/04/cost-of-owning-and-oper-
ating-vehicle-in-u-s-increases-nearly-two-percent-according-to-aaas-2013-
your-driving-costs-study.
26. The NLUPA bill, unlike CZMA, appears not to have extended its largesse and 
authorization to U.S. territories.
27. See, e.g., St. Pope John Paul II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS 40 (May 1, 1991) (“It is 
the task of the State to provide for the defense and preservation of common 
goods such as the natural and human environments, which cannot be safe-
guarded simply by market forces. Just as in the time of primitive capitalism 
the State had the duty of defending the basic rights of workers, so now, with 
the new capitalism, the State and all of society have the duty of defending those 
collective goods which, among others, constitute the essential framework for 
the legitimate pursuit of personal goals on the part of each individual.”); see 
also Summaries of EU Legislation: The Principle of Subsidiarity, Europa, http://
europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/
ai0017_en.htm (last updated Apr. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Summaries of EU 
Legislation].
28. See Summaries of EU Legislation, supra note 27.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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Though NLUPA was a completely voluntary federal 
planning mandate that state governments were free to adopt 
or decline, it was vested with a powerful double incentive. 
First, under the authority of the Secretary of the Interior, 
NLUPA offered states, that wished to apply, very substantial 
amounts of money to fund an initial planning process to 
create state-level land use plans; if a state produced a state 
land use plan approved by the Secretary under standards 
required by NLUPA, moreover, the federal grants would 
continue to be paid each year to support the planning-
implementation program.31
Second, and even more powerfully, once a state land 
use plan was approved by the Secretary, the state would 
hold a virtual veto power over any federal agency programs 
and projects proposed for the state that did not comport 
with its land use plan. Consider the practical and political 
impact of NLUPA’s kicker as it appeared in the 1970 ver-
sion of NLUPA:
§307(a). Coordination of Federal Programs. All Federal 
agencies conducting or supporting activities involving land 
use in an area subject to an approved statewide land use plan 
shall operate in accordance with the plan . . . .
(b) State and local governments submitting applications for 
Federal assistance for activities having significant land use 
implications in an area subject to an approved statewide land 
use plan shall indicate the views of the State land use plan-
ning agency as to the consistency of such activities with the 
plan. Federal agencies shall not approve proposed projects that 
are inconsistent with the [state] plan.
(c) All Federal agencies responsible for administering grant, 
loan, or guarantee programs for activities that have a ten-
dency to influence patterns of land use and development, 
including but not limited to home mortgage and interest 
subsidy programs and water and sewer facility construction 
programs, shall take cognizance of approved statewide land 
use plans . . . .32
NLUPA’s grant of state-plan consistency overrides was 
not absolute, but approval of federal initiatives inconsistent 
with state plans would require a finding, backstopped by a 
presidential procedure, that the project was nationally essen-
tial and that overriding considerations of national policy 
required such approval.33
NLUPA’s monetary incentive was clearly a potent catalyst 
for state enrollment in the NLUPA planning system, but the 
second incentive, the requirement that federal agency proj-
ects and programs be “consistent” with approved state plans, 
31. S. 268, 93d Cong. §§ 201(a), 202(a) (1973).
32. S. Rep. No. 91-1435, at 13 (1970) (emphases added).
33. Id. (“The [federal Land and Water Resources] Council may approve a feder-
ally conducted or supported project[,] a portion or portions of which may 
be inconsistent with the plan[,] if it finds that (1) the project is essential to 
the national interest and (2) there is no reasonable and prudent alternative 
which would not be inconsistent with an approved statewide land use plan. 
In the event that the Council fails to approve the project, the project may be 
undertaken only upon the express approval of the President. The President may 
approve projects inconsistent with a statewide land use plan only when over-
riding considerations of National policy require such approval.”).
had even greater potential political attraction.34 Federalism 
tensions have long existed within the United States, and 
NLUPA offered attractions for both the left and right of the 
political spectrum. Progressives tend to be communitarian, 
desiring that rational coordination be applied to the market-
place under thoughtful and objectively reasoned government 
guidance.35 NLUPA encouraged the creation of that kind of 
interconnected, rational, and coordinated overview.36 Politi-
cal factions on the right tend to favor state jurisdiction rather 
than federal, so the provision of money to strengthen states’ 
relative strength would be welcome.37
Moreover, the power that NLUPA offered states to 
override federal agencies’ projects and programs posed an 
extraordinary incentive for states to enter into the NLUPA 
process. The first step for a state under NLUPA would be 
to complete a comprehensive inventory of its own resources 
with the assistance of the Federal Land Planning Informa-
tion and Data Center, if necessary.38 That inventory then 
would be used to create an ordered set of themes by which 
the state would attempt to guide development in coming 
years with chosen statewide themes and paths.39 The state 
would also be required to implement state statutes and regu-
lations to encourage land use planning at municipal levels 
that were consistent with the state-coordinated needs and 
themes identified as necessities at the state level, with state 
agencies and enforceable regulatory structures to bring the 
plan into effect.40
Regional arrangements could be included within the 
state-level planning process. A proposed state plan would be 
reviewed for consistency with NLUPA’s generic requirements 
for comprehensive inventory, rational analysis, enforceable 
standards and procedures, consistency between local munic-
ipal plans, and overall planning enforceability.41 Once the 
plan was approved, additional annual grants would be issued 
by the Secretary, subject to continuing periodic review by 
federal agency staff to assure effective implementation.42
34. See Morris K. Udall, Land Use: Why We Need Federal Legislation, 1975 BYU L. 
Rev. 1, at 6–7 (1975) (noting the value of requiring federal consistency with 
state plans as proposed in NLUPA).
35. See Kenneth M. Dolbeare & Linda J. Medcalf, American Ideologies 
Today: From Neopolitics to New Ideas 122–23 (1st ed. 1988) (describing 
the modern American Left’s approach to managing the marketplace through 
government regulation).
36. See Udall, supra note 34, at 2 (noting the need for coordinated approach to 
land use planning that NLUPA attempted to address).
37. See Jack M. Balkin, Federalism and the Conservative Ideology, 19 Urb. Law. 
459, 491 (1987) (describing conservative ideology’s preference for states’ rights 
over federal control).
38. See S. Rep. No. 91-1435, at 3, 13–14 (1970). For example, considerations for 
the inventory included the following questions: Where were the geographi-
cal features of importance—mountains, fertile soils, water resources, and areas 
served by excellent transportation for optimum urban development? Where 
and how substantial were the state’s various natural resources, educated work-
forces, or other resources necessary to sustain an economy? Where were people 
currently living and where were employment locations presently and for the 
foreseeable future? Where were medical facilities, transportation corridors, 
education facilities, etc.?
39. Id. at 9–10.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id. at 10. NLUPA’s specific planning requirements were set out in the bill’s 
section 305(a). Id. The submission and review process were set out in section 
306. Id. at 12–13.
42. Id. at 12–13.
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The NLUPA planning program would foreseeably have 
changed the structure of land use management in the 
United States in quite revolutionary terms. State planning 
offices, if they existed, would have become the moderators 
and coordinators of land use planning throughout the state. 
By elevating land management to the state level, the over 
80,000 separate and disconnected land use systems would 
be rationalized into fifty far more coherent coordinated 
state-level initiatives.
What would America look like today if NLUPA had been 
made law and implemented? NLUPA would potentially have 
had a significant role in modernizing land management plan-
ning for two-thirds of the United States’ land base (federal 
land management agencies, on the other hand, are respon-
sible for managing approximately 28% of land in the United 
States).43 Had NLUPA passed, images of the United States 
viewed from space at night might look quite different from 
the sprawls and strip cities that currently lace the nighttime 
image of our nation. A practical political consequence of the 
new role of state plans, moreover, would likely have served 
to counterbalance the power of real estate market forces that 
currently dominate the local level. State-level review would 
probably have brought far more transparency (given state-
level media access and freedom of information and sun-
shine acts) and far more community-based counterbalancing 
against the focused force of developers bent on projects that 
potentially disserve the public interest.
3. CZMA: Consistency Planning in Modern 
Practice
Although the federal land planning system represented 
within NLUPA never became law, it represented a substan-
tive and procedural model of sophistication and practicality 
in designing and enforcing meaningful resource manage-
ment. That model is reflected on a much smaller scale in the 
structure of today’s CZMA planning and implementation, 
in which the NLUPA theory of layered planning coordina-
tion is applied in practice to lands and resources within the 
“coastal zone,” demonstrating a planning approach that com-
pares favorably with other federal land and resource manage-
ment programs.44
When CZMA was enacted in 1972, Congress recognized 
that states were not effective at controlling development 
of their coastal zones, to the detriment of natural coastal 
resources. Congress announced that effective coastal zone 
management would require, in addition to ample federal 
support, that states take an active interest in their own coast-
lines. The announced national policy of CZMA is to preserve, 
protect, develop, and, where possible, to restore or enhance 
natural coastal zone resources for future generations.45 The 
43. Ross W. Gorte et al., Cong. Research Serv., R42346, Federal Land 
Ownership: Overview and Data 3 (2012).
44. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, sec. 
6202, § 302, 104 Stat. 1388-299, 1388-299–1388-300 (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. § 1451).
45. Coastal Zone Management Act § 303(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (2012).
goal of the Act was to encourage state responsibility through 
the development of area-specific management plans.46
Thirty-five states and territories contain coastal lands 
and thus are eligible to enroll in CZMA, and thirty-four 
currently are so enrolled.47 CZMA’s planning and regula-
tory structure covers each state’s “coastal zone,” defined as 
coastal waters, including the lands therein and thereunder, 
adjacent shorelands, and inland to the extent necessary to 
control direct and significant impacts on the coastal waters.48 
Because specific delineation is ultimately subject to each 
state’s further definition, the inland coverage of each state’s 
coastal zone can be extensive or limited. For instance, while 
Delaware and Hawaii have designated their entire state as a 
coastal zone, some states designate only counties affected by 
tides, while Louisiana has designated less than the full reach 
of tidal waters.49
Because CZMA is a high-functioning land planning sys-
tem under a federal mandate, it not only provides an illumi-
nating guide to how NLUPA might have worked, but also 
holds lessons for federal agency resource management plans 
in general. The CZMA process, as it exists today, is articu-
lated and serious in its land use planning strictures. Under 
CZMA, the required elements of a plan are set out similarly 
to the NLUPA criteria.50 When a state chooses to partici-
pate, its coastal management program (“CMP”) and plan 
must meet certain federal requirements, with approval by the 
46. Coastal Zone Management Act § 302(i), 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (2012).
47. See Coastal Zone Management Programs, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Admin., http://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/?redirect=301ocm (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2015). Participating states and U.S. territories listed on the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration website include Alabama, American 
Samoa, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington and Wis-
consin. Id. Alaska withdrew from the National Coastal Zone Management 
Program on July 1, 2011. Id. Illinois joined the national coastal management 
program on March 9, 2012. Id.
48. Coastal Zone Management Act § 304, 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1)  (2012) (“The 
term ‘coastal zone’ means the coastal waters (including the lands therein 
and thereunder) and the adjacent shorelands (including the waters therein 
and thereunder), strongly influenced by each other and in proximity to the 
shorelines of the several coastal states, and includes islands, transitional and 
intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches . . . . The zone extends 
inland from the shorelines only to the extent necessary to control shorelands 
the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters, 
and to control those geographical areas which are likely to be affected by or 
vulnerable to sea level rise.”).
49. See generally Coastal Zone Management Programs, supra note 47; see also La. 
Dep’t of Natural Res., Office of Coastal Mgmt., & La. Coastal Prot. 
& Restoration Auth., Defining Louisiana’s Coastal Zone: A Science-
based Evaluation of the Louisiana Coastal Zone Inland Boundary 
(2010), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OCM/CoastalZoneBound-
ary/CZB_Study_Report_October_2010_Final.pdf (demonstrating that the 
Louisiana state definition of the coastal zone takes into account tidal surge 
areas, height above sea level, and a variety of water-impacting parameters; it 
has been adjusted several times and has included roughly 5.3 million acres).
50. See Coastal Zone Management Act § 306(d)(2)(A)–(H), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)
(2)(A)–(H) (2012) (stating that the Secretary shall find the management pro-
gram identifies boundaries, defines permissible land uses and water uses, des-
ignates areas of particular concern, identifies the means of control, establishes 
guidelines on priorities of uses, describes organizational structure and respon-
sibilities of local, area-wide, State, regional, and interstate agencies, contains a 
planning process for the protection of areas with environmental, recreational, 
and cultural value, and also contains a planning process for management of the 
impacts from energy facilities).
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Secretary of Commerce through the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s Office of Ocean and Coastal 
Resource Management (“OCRM”). The state plan must be 
approved if it meets the requirements listed in section 306(d) 
of CZMA.51 Once a state’s proposed CMP plan is approved 
by the Secretary, the state is vested with the power of con-
sistency veto over federal agency projects and programs,52 
and in return, it must submit to the continuing oversight of 
OCRM, which holds jurisdiction over the program.
OCRM apparently takes its supervisory power seriously. 
Each state must submit a five-year review process in order 
to maintain continued federal grants to support the coastal 
zone program, and numerous informal reviews take place 
during the interim between the five-year formal reviews.53 
OCRM apprises itself of substantial changes that occur 
either in the state’s statutes or regulations, or in the condi-
tions under which the plan operates.54 Although there is 
no citizen suit provision in CZMA, citizen complaints to 
OCRM reportedly engender agency review of state compli-
ance and, in some cases, citizens have been able to enforce 
CZMA plan requirements under state or federal administra-
tive procedures acts.55
Recently, OCRM commissioned an External Evaluation 
of State Coastal Zone Management & National Estuarine 
Research Reserve System Programs.56 The study highlights 
the relevancy, effectiveness, and impact of the State Coastal 
Zone Management Program (“SCZMP”) based on inter-
views from fifty-seven observers, including SCZMP manag-
ers and external parties (e.g., national experts, state partners, 
affiliates, and stakeholders). The evaluation study also con-
cluded that SCZMPs should expand the number of partici-
pants defined as coastal managers and increase involvement 
in public dialogues related to significant direct and indirect 
impacts upon the coastal zone, including public infrastruc-
ture developments.57
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1). 
52. Coastal Zone Management Act § 307(c)(1)–(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)–(2) 
(2012) (“(1) Each Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone 
that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be 
carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable 
with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs . . . . 
(2) Any Federal agency which shall undertake any development project in the 
coastal zone of a state shall insure that the project is, to the maximum extent 
practicable, consistent with the enforceable policies of approved state manage-
ment programs.”).
53. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Final Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act Section 309 Program Guidance 4, 8 (2009).
54. See Coastal Zone Management Act §§ 312(a), 316(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1458(a), 
1462(a) (2012) (discussing Secretary’s role in reviewing the performance of 
coastal management states, coordinating with Congress, and reporting to the 
President); see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.131–923.133 (2014) (discussing pro-
cedures for continuing review of state CZMA programs); Nat’l Oceanic & 
Atmospheric Admin., supra note 53 (discussing OCRM’s review process for 
state coastal management plans submitted as part of grant process). 
55. See, e.g., S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Wise, 2003-CP-15-1137, at 1, 
2, 32–34 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Colleton Cnty. Feb. 20, 2007) (holding, in citi-
zen nongovernmental organization lawsuit, that state agency failure to enforce 
coastal zone requirements limiting wetland fill bulkheading constitutes a viola-
tion requiring permanent injunction).
56. SRA Int’l, Inc. & The Council Oak, External Evaluation of State 
Coastal Zone Management & National Estuarine Research Reserve 
System Programs 1 (2010), available at http://coast.noaa.gov/czm/media/
evaluationczmnerrs.pdf.
57. Id.
Interestingly, neither NLUPA nor CZMA included an 
explicit citizen enforcement process, but, at least in the 
CZMA example, it appears that citizens’ input has been 
incorporated administratively in a way that reinforces the 
regulatory system. For example, during federal consistency 
reviews, the Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Manage-
ment enters into a twenty-one-day public comment period 
in which the public is invited to weigh in on the agency 
decision process.58 Where licenses and land use permits are 
concerned, the agency conducts a similar review under the 
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act.59 While public 
comment on land use decisions is nothing new, the agency 
in practice has responded seriously to public inputs and 
complaints.60 In practice, CZMA has indeed helped control 
what otherwise would have been uncoordinated develop-
ment in the coastal zone area, particularly with regard to 
energy facilities.
CZMA has reportedly led to several major consistency 
blocks by states and their state-approved plans against major 
and potentially disruptive energy facilities that otherwise 
would have been developed without sensitivity to state-level 
concerns.61 As with NLUPA, under CZMA, a federal agency 
can appeal to the Secretary for exceptions to the state-plan 
consistency requirement, where it can allege that the federal 
agency program or project presents a “paramount interest of 
the United States.”62 This override, however, is only rarely uti-
lized, and, even in the case of emergency situations, the fed-
eral agency activity must be as consistent as possible with the 
state management plan.63 Once the emergency has passed, 
the activity must come into compliance with the CMP.64 In 
sum, the current practice of CZMA tends to indicate that the 
layered planning process established under federal mandate 
by NLUPA would have been workable, although at a national 
scale more political complexities clearly would have been 
brought to bear. The fundamental partnership between state 
and federal in this model appears to provide more checks and 
balances internally, as well as permitting public input at the 
front end and subsequent implementation.
III. Federal Resource Management Planning
A. SUWA’s Agency Deficiencies
One fundamental impression from observation of today’s 
federal CZMA planning mandate in practice is the seri-
ousness of the effort put into the official CZMA planning 
58. See Mass. Office of Coastal Zone Mgmt., Policy Guide 7 (2011).
59. Id. at 14.
60. Interview with Project Review Coordinator, Mass. Office of Coastal Zone 
Mgmt. (May 17, 2014).
61. See SRA Int’l, Inc. & The Council Oak, supra note 56, at 12.
62. Coastal Zone Management Act § 307(c)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) 
(2012) (“[T]he President may, upon written request from the Secretary, ex-
empt from compliance those elements of the Federal agency activity that are 
found by the Federal court to be inconsistent with an approved State program, 
if the President determines that the activity is in the paramount interest of the 
United States.”).
63. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(b) (2014).
64. See id.
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process and the seriousness of enforcement of plan require-
ments once CZMA plans have been federally approved. The 
contrast between the federally mandated planning process 
within the more familiar federal resource management stat-
utes on one hand, and the NLUPA and the CZMA layered 
planning process on the other, is significant.
Environmental management planning by government 
agencies, especially when it deals with resources entirely 
owned by the public, should be a straightforward and effec-
tive means to achieve rational environmental protection 
and sustainable development. However, it is not. Observers 
have long noted that it is not exceptional for federal resource 
management agencies to suffer serious deficits in their prepa-
ration and implementation of congressionally mandated, 
official plans for sustainable management and protection of 
resources entrusted to their jurisdiction.65 Intensive criticism 
has been recurrent in the management of mining, timber, 
ranching and grazing, water conservation on the federal 
lands, and more.66
The SUWA case, in its various contexts—factual, politi-
cal, and judicial—unpleasantly reflects many of the major 
shortcomings that can occur in a federal agency’s implemen-
tation of its statutory mandate and of the congressionally 
required plans designed to guide the agency’s actions in ful-
filling its statutory duties.67 The federal resource management 
agency involved in the SUWA case was the Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) in the Department of the Interior.68 
BLM manages a number of areas that have been designated 
as “wilderness study areas” (“WSA”) under the terms of the 
Wilderness Act of 1964 as supplemented by FLPMA.69 The 
Wilderness Act provides a process by which Congress can 
vote to set aside areas of “untrammeled” federal lands, free of 
disruptive human activities and the mark of human exploita-
tion as vestigial, undeveloped enclaves of the natural legacy 
the nation received at its inception.70 Of the nearly 650 mil-
lion acres of federal land, approximately fifty million in the 
contiguous United States have been designated officially as 
wilderness by Congress.71
65. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland Manage-
ment I: The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 Envtl. L. 535, 539, 
563 (1982) (pointing to political and financial conditions that impede effective 
land management).
66. See, e.g., id. at 539, 560–63, 579–80; see also The Electronic Drummer, Tho-
reau Inst., http://www.ti.org (last updated Dec. 31, 2006) (promoting “the 
repeal of federal and state planning laws and the closure of state and local plan-
ning departments”).
67. See SUWA, 542 U.S. 55, 58–59, 66–67 (2004).
68. Id. at 57–58.
69. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012) (containing no relevant 
planning requirement); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976; 43 
U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012) (containing no relevant planning requirement).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012) (providing that designated wilderness areas, 
subject to certain exceptions, “shall [have] no commercial enterprise and 
no permanent road  . . . no use of motor vehicles  . . . and no [manmade] 
structure[s]”); see also Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Re-
flections on the National Parks 91–101 (1980) (providing a history of 
the Wilderness Act).
71. Federal Lands and Indian Reservations, U.S. Geological Survey, http://na-
tionalatlas.gov/printable/fedlands.html (last visited June 10, 2014) (providing 
the total federally-owned acreage); The Beginnings of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System, Wilderness.net, http://www.wilderness.net/nwps/fast-
facts (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (“[T]he NWPS . . . now includes 762 areas 
(108,916,658 acres) in 44 states and Puerto Rico. In 1980, the passage of the 
As one concern addressed in FLPMA, Congress recog-
nized that the process of wilderness designation was taking 
protracted spans of time, not to mention substantial politi-
cal energy, and that, in the meantime, many areas eligible 
for wilderness were being forever lost to potential congres-
sional wilderness designation. Ongoing development and 
user activities were destroying the wild lands’ wilderness 
character before they could be fully presented for congres-
sional review.72
Accordingly, FLPMA legislated a strict requirement for 
federal resource management agencies. Pursuant to FLPMA, 
the Secretary of the Interior identified WSAs, roadless lands 
of 5000 acres or more possessing “wilderness characteris-
tics” as determined in the Secretary’s land inventory,73 to be 
held in protective custody pending comprehensive studies 
of their suitability for congressional designation as wilder-
ness. For example, Utah contains roughly 50 million acres, 
and in 1991, “out of 3.3 million acres in Utah identified for 
wilderness study, two million were recommended as suitable 
for designation.”74 “This recommendation was forwarded to 
Congress, which [had] not yet acted upon it.”75
Until Congress acts one way or the other, FLPMA’s spe-
cific wilderness provisions require that “the Secretary shall 
continue to manage such lands . . . in a manner so as not 
to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as 
wilderness.”76 This wilderness “non-impairment” mandate 
significantly differentiates FLPMA land policy in general 
(to which FLPMA assigns a “multiple use-sustained yield” 
directive)77 from those areas possessing wilderness study 
qualities. In recognition of the Wilderness Act mandate, the 
Department of the Interior issued a special Interim Manage-
ment Policy for Lands under Wilderness Review (“IMP”).78 
The IMP requires the agency
to ensure that each WSA satisfies [the definition of wil-
derness] at the time Congress makes a decision on the 
area . . . . The Department therefore has a responsibility 
to ensure that the existing wilderness values of all WSAs 
.  .  . are not degraded so far . . . as to significantly con-
strain the Congress’ prerogative to . . . designate a WSA 
as a wilderness . . . .79
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) added over 56 
million acres of wilderness to the system . . . . Alaska contains just over half of 
America’s wilderness, only about 2.7% of the contiguous United States—an 
area about the size of Minnesota—is protected as wilderness.”). The designa-
tion of a wilderness area can be made only by Act of Congress. 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1782(b) (2012).
72. See Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Land under Wilderness 
Review, 44 Fed. Reg. 72,014, 72,014 (Dec. 12, 1979) (explaining that the In-
terim Management Policy applies prior to Congress’ review and designation). 
73. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59.
74. Id. (citing Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Utah 
Statewide Wilderness Study Report 3 (Oct. 1991)).
75. Id. 
76. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (emphasis added).
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2012) (“The Secretary shall manage the public lands 
under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, in accordance with the 
land use plans . . . when they are available . . . .”).
78. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, H-8550-1 Rel. 8-67, 
Interim Management Policy for Lands Under Wilderness Review 
(1995).
79. Id. at 4.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
stated the following with regard to FLPMA’s wilderness 
“non-impairment” mandate authority:
As part of the non-impairment mandate, the IMP mandates 
that the BLM may only authorize “non-impairing” activ-
ity in the WSAs. Under the IMP, use of WSA land will be 
considered “non-impairing” if two criteria are met. First, the 
use must be temporary in nature, meaning that it does not 
“create surface disturbance or involve permanent placement 
of structures” (emphasis added). The IMP defines “surface 
disturbance” as “any new disruption of the soil or vegeta-
tion which would necessitate reclamation.” Second, after 
the activity terminates, “the wilderness values must not have 
been degraded so far as to constrain significantly the Con-
gress’s prerogative regarding the area’s suitability for preser-
vation as wilderness.”80
Aside from identification of WSAs and the nonimpair-
ment requirement, the main tool that the Department 
of the Interior establishes to protect wilderness-eligible 
areas is the land use plan (“LUP”).81 FLPMA contains an 
explicit requirement that subject agencies develop, main-
tain, and, when appropriate, revise LUPs for the territories 
they administer,82 and requires the agencies to “manage the 
public lands  . . . in accordance with the land use plans.”83 
BLM’s implementing regulations sometimes call these plans 
“resource management plans.”84   FLPMA plans, adopted 
after notice and comment, are “designed to guide and con-
trol future management actions.”85
Generally, a LUP for a particular area describes allowable 
uses, goals for future condition of the land, and specific next 
steps.86 BLM’s LUPs are clearly established as mandatory; 
BLM regulations state that the agency “will adhere  to the 
terms, conditions, and decisions of officially approved and 
adopted resource related plans.”87 The Department of the 
Interior’s WSA LUPs are dominated by the wilderness man-
date; they are clearly “dominant use” plans, not “multiple 
use” plans.88 As the IMP provides, nonimpairment of wilder-
ness quality is the instrumental standard.89 In contrast, the 
majority of “multiple uses” as defined and exercised in non-
WSA areas could cause substantial and long lasting distur-
80. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1225 n.4 (10th Cir. 
2002).
81. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012) (“The Secretary shall, with public involvement 
and consistent with the terms and conditions of this Act, develop, maintain, 
and, when appropriate, revise land use plans.”).
82. Id.
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2012).
84. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n) (2014) (“Resource management plan means a land 
use plan . . . .”).
85. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-2 (2014); see also 43 C.F.R. § 1610.2  (2014) (defining 
role of public participation in resource management); see generally 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1712 (describing FLPMA’s land use plans).
86. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n).
87. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(c) (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Plater et al., Environmental Law & Policy: Nature, Law & So-
ciety 386–92 (4th ed. 2009) (describing the difference between “multiple use” 
and “dominant use”). 
89. Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Land Under Wilderness Re-
view, 44 Fed. Reg. 72,014, 72,015 (Dec. 12, 1979).
bance and alteration of the character of the land and ecology 
of WSAs.90
Off-road vehicles (“ORV”) are a primary threat to the 
wild character of public lands, particularly in the West. In 
stretches of desert such as the Factory Butte WSA contested 
in SUWA, ORV tracks can, in one afternoon, carve up the 
fragile desert floor leaving long-lasting rutted tracks.91 Roads 
developed within WSAs not only create permanent features 
detracting from wilderness designation, but also open these 
areas to a wide variety of other disruptive activities that 
degrade the wilderness quality of the area.92
In SUWA, pressures of ORV recreationists to drive their 
vehicles throughout WSAs in Southern Utah, and BLM’s 
insistent reluctance to restrict such wilderness-destroying 
activities, reflect a complexity of social, economic, and 
political forces. These areas are not only extremely attrac-
tive to motorized outdoor recreation users, where power-
ing a macho internal combustion machine through virgin 
territory is apparently of particular attraction. The wil-
derness-cancelling effect of ORVs and beaten trails is also 
extremely attractive to market forces eager to open up these 
untapped “empty” public lands to resource exploitation—
timber, mining, ranching, and intensive recreation like 
ski resorts.93 Strong political pressures support the ORV 
activity as one foot in the door to future development, 
specifically for the purpose of blocking potential congres-
sional designation of an area as wilderness.94 Profit-driven 
corporate initiatives and state governmental interests in 
maximizing extractive industries produce major resistance 
against designation of wilderness and major incentives to 
promote uses of the study areas that will prevent them from 
being “locked up” in the future. As a politically reactive 
entity, BLM understandably responds to the pressures that 
impact it most consistently and powerfully—not the often 
diffuse and plaintive desires of low-intensity hikers, bird-
ers, and fisherman, nor the long-ago congressional majority 
that passed the handful of sentences in the Wilderness Act, 
but rather the much larger numbers of local communities, 
state legislators, and corporate lobbyists, who all see WSAs 
as commodities ripe for near-term exploitation to serve sub-
sistence needs or profit maximization.95
At issue in the SUWA case were the LUPs for the Factory 
Butte and San Rafael WSAs areas, which are both fragile and 
90. See Plater et al., supra note 88, at 389.
91. See infra Fig. 1 (showing ORV tracks that may last for fifty years or more); 
see also Off-Road Vehicles, Center for Biological Diversity, http://www.
biologicaldiversity.com/programs/public_lands/off-road_vehicles/ (last visited 
June 10, 2014).
92. See generally S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, Petition to Secretary of the 
Interior: Request for Immediate Consideration and Action on the 
Factory Butte Area Emergency Protection Order (Apr. 1, 2005).
93. Editorial, No Management Plan: BLM Makes Gift of Land to Off-Roaders, Drill-
ers, Salt Lake Trib. (Aug. 11, 2008, 9:42 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/
printfriendly.php?id=10171145&itype=ngpsid; see also Michael C. Blumm & 
Sherry L. Bosse, Norton v. SUWA and the Unraveling of Federal Public Land 
Planning, 18 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 105, 148 (2007).
94. Blumm & Bosse, supra note 93.
95. See, e.g., C.F. Runge, Book Review, 22 Natural Resources J. 262, 262–64 
(1982) (reviewing Paul J. Culhane, Public Land Politics: Interest Group 
Influence on the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management 
(1st ed. 1981)).
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arid territories, previously roadless, and perhaps beckoning 
mineral exploration as well as ORV adventure.96 BLM had 
acknowledged that road building and the terrain-destroying 
effects of ORVs could eliminate the potential wilderness-
eligible character of these areas; in 1990, a LUP identified 
Factory Butte as a region requiring special monitoring for 
ORV use, stating that “[t]he area will be monitored and 
closed if warranted,” and indicating that “[r]esource damage 
will be documented and recommendations made for correc-
tive action,” and that an ORV implementation plan for San 
Rafael “will be developed.”97 BLM, however, took only trivial 
steps to restrict ORV entry into the wild areas98—vivid ORV 
tracks laced the desert floor around the butte—and had not 
done what the LUPs had seemed to promise. The Agency 
acknowledged that, for the prior ten years, it had not com-
plied with the Factory Butte monitoring pledge, in particular 
failing to maintain monitoring supervision files specified in 
the LUP, and had not developed an adequate implementation 
plan for San Rafael.99 BLM clearly recognized that extensive 
wilderness-negating ORV use was taking place in the WSAs, 
and just as clearly, the Agency was turning a blind eye to 
their degradation.
B. SUWA’s Citizen Enforcement Effort
As so often in the history of U.S. environmental law, it was 
not the agencies (or Congress, or the President) that pushed 
the enforcement of the environmental protection laws that 
applied; citizen litigation remains the main workhorse.100 
96. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1233 (10th Cir. 
2002).
97. Id. at 1233–34.
98. At Factory Butte, BLM merely posted some signs and closed certain roads. See 
id. at 1230.
99. BLM admitted that it prepared an ORV implementation plan for the San 
Rafael WSA on October 6, 1997, but that it had been only partially imple-
mented. Id. at 1234.
100. Citizen litigation has shaped most of the modern administrative structure of 
environmental law, from NEPA as a tangible procedural requirement to the 
Figure 1: ORV; Factory Butte WSA
To the left, a quad-track ORV. To the right, a Factory Butte Wilderness Study Area pho-
tograph showing the extensive ORV tracks that are likely to prevent the WSA’s designa-
tion as wilderness under the Wilderness Act of 1964. Ray Bloxham, Impacts of Off-Road 
Vehicles: Factory Butte, S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, http://action.suwa.org/site/Pho
toAlbumUser?view=UserPhotoDetail&PhotoID=14677&position=4&AlbumID=5821 
(last visited May 6, 2015).
Southern Utah Wilderness Association made three separate 
claims in a citizen suit: (1) BLM violated the “non-impair-
ment” mandate, by allowing ORVs to roam unconstrained 
in the WSAs;101 (2) BLM failed to follow the LUPs requir-
ing that it monitor ongoing ORV use to determine whether 
the degree to which the land was being eroded, in order to 
support responsive regulation;102 and (3) the agency failed to 
take a “hard look” at whether it should issue a supplemen-
tal Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), a NEPA claim 
resulting from mushrooming ORV use and BLM’s departure 
from plan obligations.103
Instead of reconsidering and reforming its patterns of 
nonfeasance, BLM bitterly resisted the citizen challenges. 
As to the nonimpairment violation, BLM argued that, as 
long as an agency is taking some action toward fulfilling its 
legal obligations, courts may not compel compliance with 
statutory commands.104 The Tenth Circuit disagreed: “Our 
inquiry under [5 U.S.C.] § 706(1) is . . . whether the agency 
has unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed a legally 
required, nondiscretionary duty . . . . [T]he non-impairment 
mandate obligation of the BLM is a discrete obligation hav-
ing independent significance.”105
As to the official FLPMA plans, BLM argued that LUPs 
do not create binding, mandatory, non-
discretionary duties because LUPs “are 
not Congressional mandates, and they are 
subject to contingencies, such as availabil-
ity of funds, personnel and the presence 
of competing priorities,”106 an argument 
the circuit court dismissed, noting in part 
the Code of Federal Regulations provision 
that BLM “will adhere to the terms, condi-
tions, and decisions of officially approved 
and adopted resource related plans.”107 
“Straightforward reading of the relevant 
LUPs, as well as applicable statutes and 
regulations, suggests that the BLM must 
carry out specific activities promised in 
LUPs.”108 The Tenth Circuit also rejected 
BLM’s argument that its ability to amend 
LUPs frees the agency from adhering to 
existing plans.109 “Just as the BLM can be 
held accountable for failing to act with regard to its non-
impairment duty, it also can be held accountable for failing 
most intricate question of how air pollution offset credits can be brokered in 
interstate transfers, in a vast swath of law-building since 1970. One cannot 
understand the legal development of major command and control regulatory 
systems like the Clean Air Act without knowing the role played by citizen 
NGOs and their attorneys. The one possible exception to the primacy of citi-
zen litigation is probably the field of toxics regulation, in which agency initia-
tive has built most of the doctrine, not so much in response to citizen litigation 
as to the deep popular revulsion against toxic contamination.
101. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d at 1223.
102. See id. at 1233.
103. See id. at 1236–37.
104. Id. at 1231.
105. Id. at 1231–32.
106. Id. at 1233.
107. Id. at 1234 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(c) (2014)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1235.
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to act as required by the mandatory duties outlined in an 
LUP.”110 BLM finally argued that plans only guided future 
and affirmative actions, not failures to act in accordance with 
an existing plan.111 The Tenth Circuit was unconvinced and 
reversed the district court on that point as well.112
C. SUWA in Justice Scalia’s Court
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, however, 
Justice Scalia fashioned the opinion of the Court—mys-
tifyingly unanimous113—that not only took no notice of 
the Agency’s dereliction of its duty to protect the wilder-
ness study areas and attempted to weaken the statutory 
commands,114 but, more to the point, seriously eroded the 
concept of federal resource management planning. As to the 
statute’s nonimpairment command, in his SUWA decision, 
Justice Scalia declared:
[I]t leaves BLM a great deal of discretion in deciding how to 
achieve it . . . . SUWA argues that [under FLPMA’s] categor-
ical imperative, namely the command to comply with the 
non-impairment mandate . . . a federal court could simply 
enter a general order compelling compliance with that man-
date, [but the] principal purpose of the APA limitations . . . 
is to protect agencies from undue judicial interference with 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1235–36. As to the NEPA claim, BLM argued that it was in the process 
of amending its LUP within three years to take account of admittedly increased 
ORV use; the Tenth Circuit concluded that possible future procedures did not 
exempt the agency from the “hard look” doctrine. Id. at 1240.
113. See SUWA, 542 U.S. 55, 56 (2004). The unanimity of the SUWA decision is 
hard to explain, but may be laid at the door of Justice Scalia’s ability to manip-
ulate administrative law holdings. The author’s first experience of these abilities 
was in New York v. Thomas, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), in which then-
Judge Scalia persuaded his circuit court colleagues to overturn a district court 
ruling, New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985), that had held 
that the terms of Clean Air Act section 115 required regulation of cross-border 
pollution once an EPA Administrator had made a statutorily-required “find-
ing” (that pollution from the U.S. crossed to Canada, and that Canada granted 
reciprocal standing to U.S. plaintiffs). See Bennett A. Caplan, The Applicabil-
ity of Clean Air Act Section 115 to Canada’s Transboundary Acid Precipitation 
Problem, 11 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 539 (1984); Adam Willis, Thomas v. 
New York: Sisiphyean Tragedy on the Environmental Stage, 10 Loy. L.A. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 469 (1988).  By arguing that the EPA finding (clearly adjudica-
tory, not rulemaking) was “rulemaking,” Judge Scalia thereby convinced his 
two brethren that it was void for lack of the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedure required under 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). Thus, the statutory envi-
ronmental protection—which had been the product of a careful compromise 
in Congress—was nullified. Then-Judge Scalia, it should be noted, for a num-
ber of years had been teaching administrative law at the University of Chicago 
and, presumably, clearly knew the difference between agencies’ adjudicatory 
and rulemaking actions.
114. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66. In introducing FLPMA’s provisions in SUWA, Justice 
Scalia at the start emphasized “multiple use” as the Act’s central theme: FLPMA 
“established a policy in favor of retaining public lands for multiple use man-
agement…including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, 
watershed, wildlife and fish, and [uses serving] natural scenic, scientific and 
historical values.” Id. at 58 (internal citations omitted). He then did acknowl-
edge the Wilderness Act mandate, but presented BLM’s task as “balanc[ing] 
wilderness protection against other uses.” Id. at 59. But of course there is not 
supposed to be any such balance of “other uses” that undercut wilderness pro-
tection, against wilderness protection. Justice Scalia had attempted some of 
the same legerdemain in arguing that the Endangered Species Act’s (“ESA”) 
inclusion of an extinction-balancing exemption to be applied in highly extraor-
dinary circumstances implied a general principle of cost-benefit analysis within 
the ESA. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172 (1997).
their lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in 
abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both exper-
tise and information to resolve.115
As to the enforceability of plans, Justice Scalia made a per-
plexing distinction:
The statutory directive that BLM manage “in accordance 
with” land use plans and the regulatory requirement that 
authorizations and actions “conform to” those plans, prevent 
BLM from taking actions inconsistent with the provisions 
of a land use plan. Unless and until the plan is amended, 
such actions can be set aside as contrary to law  . . . . The 
claim presently under discussion, however, would have us go 
further and conclude that a statement in a plan that BLM 
“will” take this, that, or the other action, is a binding com-
mitment [enforceable by citizens in court] . . . .116
Up to this point, the Justice’s position on enforceability 
of plans is not clear. What is the difference between what 
he acknowledges as enforceable consistency “conforming 
to” and “in accordance with” a plan, and, apparently, unen-
forceable plan provisions that declare an agency “will take” a 
particular action? The latter, which he deems unenforceable, 
actually seems more declarative than the former; his argu-
ment may also turn on an unspoken assumption that acts 
of omission are not “actions.” But Justice Scalia’s subsequent 
words clarified his vision of planning:
Quite unlike a specific statutory command  . . . a land use 
plan is generally a statement of priorities; it guides and con-
strains actions, but does not (at least in the usual case) pre-
scribe them .  . . . [A]llowing general enforcement of plan 
terms would lead to pervasive interference with BLM’s own 
ordering of priorities . . . . Its predictable consequence would 
be much vaguer plans from BLM in the future—making 
coordination with other agencies more difficult, and depriv-
ing the public of important information concerning the 
agency’s long-range intentions. We therefore hold that the 
[plan’s] statements to the effect that BLM will conduct “[u]
se [s]upervision and [m]onitoring” in designated areas—like 
other “will do” projections of agency action set forth in land 
use plans—are not a legally binding commitment enforce-
able under [APA] §706.117
What is the result of the SUWA decision? On its face, 
the decision removes effective citizen enforceability of plans 
being violated by federal agencies by deferring to agency dis-
cretion on how statutory mandates should be implemented. 
Everyone in the SUWA litigation recognized that without 
active citizen enforcement, expanding ORV uses of the WSAs 
would continue unabated, destroying the WSA’s wilderness 
character.118 The laws would not be enforced by the official 
government entities; only citizens, bringing an enforcement 
action in court, would enforce the statutory and regulatory 
provisions regarding nonimpairment and planning.
115. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66.
116. Id. at 69.
117. Id. at 71–72.
118. Id. at 60–61.
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The limitation of citizen enforcement, the essential ele-
ment in the nation’s history of environmental protection law, 
in SUWA and a line of other standing cases119 is a conse-
quence discernibly traceable to Justice Scalia’s long-running 
antipathy to such citizen actions. In a famous quote from an 
address and article he prepared for the Suffolk Law Review, 
in response to Judge Skelly Wright’s stentorian Calvert Cliffs 
NEPA decision (which declared that the goal of citizen suits 
was to assure that important congressional intentions to 
reduce pollution not be “lost or misdirected in the vast hall-
ways of the federal bureaucracy”),120 Justice Scalia asked:
Does what I have said [cutting back citizen standing] mean 
that . . . “important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls 
of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways 
of the federal bureaucracy?” Of course it does—and a good 
thing, too  . . . [L]ots of once-heralded programs ought to 
get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere . . . .121
But SUWA not only removes the potential for effective 
citizen enforcement of the statutes through the leverage of 
required plan provisions, it also undercuts the concept of 
planning as an instrumental tool for federal agencies’ imple-
mentation of their congressionally required duties. If an 
agency knows that a reviewing court will not hold it to the 
terms of an official plan which it has produced according 
to statutory mandate, its planning becomes casual, infor-
mal, or mere cosmetology. According to informed observ-
ers within the federal land bureaucracy, the effect of the 
SUWA decision has been to make agency FLPMA planning 
little more than window-dressing on the pragmatic policies 
and practices that otherwise dictate the daily operation of a 
federal agency like BLM. In sum, the public participation 
required in the planning process can be regarded as merely 
an opportunity to enlist stakeholder support, not a process 
of hammering out serious provisions to address and enforce 
congressional mandates.122
IV. Possible Political Explanations
What explains the tendency of federal agencies to under-
perform the duties required of them by resource manage-
ment statutes and to erode the provisions of the plans that 
they themselves have made and formally adopted to achieve 
those purposes? And what explains the judicial tendency 
to acquiesce in that agency tendency? It comes as no sur-
prise that there would be extraordinary political pressures 
brought to bear on federal agencies managing huge blocks 
of federal lands and resources, particularly in the western 
United States, where more than half the terrain is owned 
by the citizens of the United States rather than in private 
119. See Plater et al., supra note 88, at 241–53 (providing a chronological history 
of standing cases).
120. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
121. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 897 (1983) (dismissing Judge 
Skelly Wright’s influential clarion call decision in Calvert Cliffs).
122. Interviews with Informants at the 2014 Public Interest Envtl. Law Conference 
in Eugene, Or. (Feb. 27–Mar. 2, 2014).
or state holdings.123 The resources within that land base are 
understandably the subject, at many levels, of eager initia-
tives for exploitative development.
Given the pressures of the complex political contexts in 
which agencies operate, mandatory federal plans—especially 
those where public participation is curtailed or nonexis-
tent—can fall prey to the same kind of entropic tendencies 
as EISs; if not downright mistaken in execution (e.g., plan-
ning to protect walruses in the Caribbean), they can often be 
vague, evasive, truncated, and false.124
Agencies exist within a political context where congres-
sionally promulgated resource protection statutes, formed 
in a focused moment of public attention and resolve, declare 
public policies and occasionally impose stringent legal man-
dates. Regulatory statutes typically come into being at a 
moment of public recognition of “market failure,” i.e., the 
private marketplace is in some particular respect failing to 
serve the public interest. Once a statute is passed, however, 
the public’s attention tends to drift to other areas of con-
cern, and congressional resolve along with it. But the eco-
nomic and political forces whose actions may have triggered 
the passage of the regulatory statutes do not drift away; 
they maintain their daily attention, concern, and resistance 
to the public values being thrust upon them. Agencies are 
handed the ambitious mandates of statutes and ordered to 
bring them into reality through rulemaking, adjudicative 
enforcement, and programmatic planning and implementa-
tion. The insider pressures, now focused upon the agencies 
left holding the statutory bag, are intensive, extensive, insis-
tent, and powerful.
A. Agency Capture and “Iron Triangles” Blunt the 
“Dipolar” Paradigm of Social Governance
Professor Lon Fuller of Harvard University once described 
the standard model of 20th-century regulatory government 
as, fundamentally, a dynamic two-sided balance.125 In his 
123. Ross W. Gorte et al., Cong. Research Serv., R42346, Federal Land 
Ownership: Overview and Data 18 (2012).
124. See Andrew Clark, BP Contingency Plan for Dealing With Oil Spill Was Riddled 
With Errors, The Guardian (June 9, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2010/jun/09/bp-oil-spill-contingency-plan (noting the plan’s 
inclusion of walruses, sea otters, and sea lions as potential victims of an oil 
spill, although none of these are found in the Gulf region). EISs often mir-
ror such deficiencies. See Matthew J. Lindstrom & Zachary A. Smith, 
The National Environmental Policy Act: Judicial Misconstruction, 
Legislative Indifference, and Executive Neglect 90, 134 (2008). Based 
on lessons learned from the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is currently preparing to 
revise the National Contingency Plan for hydrocarbon spills, which theoreti-
cally is supposed to cover pipeline breaks as well. The last time EPA updated 
the National Contingency Plan was 1994, based on lessons learned from the 
Exxon Valdez spill. In 1994, EPA created an Incident Command System that 
essentially put the spiller in charge. The entire plan is outdated. It was designed 
for conventional crude oil spills at sea, not tar sands oil that sinks or extremely 
volatile (frack) oil that explodes when spilled. This means that oil shippers are 
transporting oil without viable c-plans illegally. Further, it states a priority to 
protect public health during spill response but is silent on how to do this, de-
spite ample scientific evidence showing that crude oil is hazardous to humans 
and extreme oils are ultra-hazardous. Personal Communication from Dr. Riki 
Ott, Marine Biologist and Envtl. Activist (May 20, 2014).
125. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 
383 (1978). I apply the rubric “dipolar” to describe the standard model of 
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“dipolar” explanation of the standard 20th-century gover-
nance model, one pole is the economic marketplace—the 
largest, most powerful, societal engine, driving our economy 
to generate innovation, wealth, jobs, culture, and an extraor-
dinary quality of life, as well as negative externalities like 
pollution. On the other pole, government regulations and 
regulatory agencies hold the primary responsibility of coun-
terbalancing the excesses of the marketplace economy. The 
marketplace is the largest most powerful determinant of soci-
etal behavior day by day, week by week, and year by year, 
and official government entities, not citizens themselves, are 
charged with the role of protecting the public against the 
excesses and externalities of the market system. In practice, 
however, as the resource management history of the nation 
reflects, the dipolar system, dominated by the politics of 
market forces, often fails to provide sufficient protection for 
declared public values and the public interest.
Political scientists have long evoked the image of “iron 
triangles” to describe what actually happens in the dipolar 
framework of societal governance, which often does not 
resemble the process described in civics textbooks, and helps 
understand cases like SUWA.126 “Iron triangles” are formed 
by the trilateral relationship between a powerful industry bloc, 
the governmental agency (or agencies) monitoring that sector of 
the marketplace, and the blocs of legislators who support that 
industry sector, typically coddled and served by a specialized 
cadre of lobbyists.127 “Each point of the triangle looks out 
for and serves the other two points in political and economic 
terms.”128 The narrowed, focused, interlocked interests of the 
three corners of each triangle create a powerful political sta-
tus quo within that sector of governance, each point of the 
triangle motivated by its own intricate system of rewards.129 
The triangle linkages often reflect the “capture” phenome-
non—both agency capture and legislator capture—and the 
“revolving door” syndrome.130 In each case, the iron triangle 
societal governance, amending the term that Professor Fuller in a slightly dif-
ferent context actually used (“bipolar”), which to the contemporary ear evokes 
a very different concept; see also Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Dealing With Dumb and 
Dumber: The Continuing Mission of Citizen Environmentalism, 20 J. Envtl. L. 
& Litig. 9, 25–26 (2005).
126. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico . . . 
and the Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. 
L. Rev. 391, 393–94 n.8 (2011). Current political science semantic conven-
tion appears to favor the term “interest networks” instead of “iron triangles,” 
but “interest network” implicitly misses the power realities of the “iron tri-
angle”—the actual workings of political power are obscured by the “network” 
rubric because it implies a broad array of different interests without regard to 
their relative size or influence. See Elizabeth H. Debray, Politics, Ideology 
& Education xiii (2006).
127. Plater, supra note 126, at 394 n.8.
128. Id.
129. See id.
In government as well as geometry, triangles are the strongest of all 
geometric shapes. The “iron triangle” term has useful descriptive ap-
plication in a wide variety of special interest settings, some more be-
nign than others. There are iron triangles for mining, timber, chemi-
cals, ranching and rangelands, highway construction, public works 
pork barrels, [oil and gas, big pharma, banking,] the defense procure-
ment industry, as well as for education, medicine and hospitals, sew-
age treatment, NASA, and more.
 Id. (internal citations omitted).
130. See id. at 400 (describing the “revolving door” between industry and regulators 
as producing what political science describes as agency capture).
dominates the creation and implementation of regulatory 
constraints upon the market bloc that provides the lobby-
ing, funding, and political and media support for its welfare 
and continued activity.131 At the core of the nation’s political 
establishment, iron triangles tend to work together in resist-
ing the interposition of public interest regulations and inter-
ventions by citizen and non-governmental organizational 
“outsiders.” The concept of insider iron triangles, therefore, 
undercuts the description, effectiveness, and rationale of 
dipolar governance; the putatively dipolar system too often 
becomes centripetal and unipolar.132
B. Dipolarity Meets Pluralistic Multicentrism and 
Fights Back
Prior to the early 1960s, the dipolar model was arguably an 
accurate description of how virtually all modern govern-
ments worked. The public was, conceptually, a stolid passive 
multitude. Citizens’ standing to enter actively into the pro-
cesses of governance was severely limited legally, primarily 
relegated to the constricted confines of tort law, and, beyond 
the law, to petitions and other feckless forms of protest inter-
jections into the official corridors of government.
The 1960s brought a series of significant societal changes 
in broad active citizen movements for civil rights, consumer 
protection, good music, opposition to imperial wars, and 
environmental protection.133 The environmental movement 
perhaps most notably captured the breadth of the shift away 
from the old stagnant dipolar system. Starting with the Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission 
case,134 citizens were given legal standing without the require-
In political science, “agency capture” is a well-known tendency of 
industry-agency convergence, and is part of the iron triangle phenom-
enon. A regulatory agency created in the fervor of a popular move-
ment to regulate some designated problem may begin its life energeti-
cally pursuing the overall public interest, but over time its initiative 
gradually may be eroded into narrower views, intimately linked with 
the industry and problems it was intended to solve. See Richard B. 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1669, 1684–87 (1975). Justice William O. Douglas said that 
“as I told my old friend, . . . Franklin Delano Roosevelt, . . . he should 
make every regulatory agency terminate after ten years. That’s all the 
time they’ll have to be effective before they are tamed.” The author 
recalls Justice Douglas saying this to a class of his at the University of 
Tennessee (spring semester 1974); according to the author’s recollec-
tion, on other occasions Douglas reportedly stated the optimal agency 
lifetime as five years, not ten.
 Id. at 394 n.9.
131. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Snail Darter and the Dam: How Pork-
Barrel Politics Endangered a Little Fish and Killed a River 78 (2013).
132. See Plater, supra note 126, at 393–94; see also Oxford American Dictionary 
and Thesaurus 225 (2003) (defining centripetal as “moving or tending to 
move toward a center”).
133. Within the period of two years in the early ‘60s, for instance, three books 
were written that changed the way society viewed itself. What were they? The 
Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan, The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities by Jane Jacobs, and, of course, Silent Spring by Rachel Carson. Each 
fundamentally changed the way that generation and subsequent generations 
thought about the world we live in. The extraordinary civil rights revolution—
epitomized by Martin Luther King, Jr., the consumer resurgence—represented 
by Ralph Nader’s initial assault on unsafe automobile design, and a host of 
other consumer concerns that followed this period should be added to these 
three seminal books.
134. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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ment of direct economic or constitutional property rights to 
be vindicated. The revolution in standing was reinforced by 
an array of citizen suit provisions in the parade of Nixon-era 
environmental statutes.135 The result has been that America 
began to shift away from a dipolar to a “multicentric” model. 
No longer were the official agencies and Washington insiders 
the insulated determinants of how environmental laws would 
be interpreted and implemented. As noted, every single envi-
ronmental protection statutory system in the United States 
has been fundamentally shaped by citizen involvement in 
litigation or legislative actions.
The SUWA case, in its embattled context, not to men-
tion the current history of American governance, however, 
demonstrates that “iron triangles” have not lost their power. 
BLM’s insistent foot-dragging in the course of its lax protec-
tion of the wilderness character of the subject WSAs reflects 
pressures coming from a powerful combination of local 
communities, state and federal legislators, heavily funded 
commercial recreation industries, and extractive industries’ 
political opposition to wilderness “lock-ups,” plus the agen-
cy’s own ambivalence toward conservation-minded citizen 
activists.136 This is not to say that BLM and other resource 
management agencies are monolithically biased against wil-
derness preservation and nonextractive uses. Within the agen-
cies, many estimable employees would prefer to enforce the 
resource management laws straightforwardly. The existence 
of groups like Forest Service Employees for Environmental 
Ethics and Public Employees for Environmental Responsi-
bility illustrate that fact, but also the fact of powerful “iron 
triangle” pressures, since both those groups spend a major 
part of their agendas defending public employees who get in 
trouble within the agencies for pressing for environmental 
protection compliance.137
The political market pressures upon resource management 
agencies are so great that some observers have asserted that 
the agencies will never be capable of managing public lands 
and resources as public interest legislation requires. Professor 
Jim Huffman has argued that the job of managing public 
resources is so heavily politicized, with such powerful eco-
nomic forces dominating agency operations, that the better 
solution for management of those public resources is to turn 
them over to private corporate interests;138 the argument for 
135. By my count, there were thirty-four important environmental statutes passed 
in the Nixon Administration in the three years after NEPA, which became law 
on Jan. 2, 1970, and at least twenty of these had citizen suit and fee-shifting 
provisions. Only Jimmy Carter’s years come close, with twenty in an equivalent 
span, many of which were perfecting amendments.
136. For years, environmental activists have joked that BLM stands for the “Bureau 
of Livestock and Mining.”
137. Telephone Interview with Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility’s Senior Coun-
sel (June 12, 2014).
138. See Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 241, 273, 276–77 (1994) (“[P]ublic lands management is fundamen-
tally about politics  . . . . The lords of the public lands are, and always have 
been, private interests . . . . So long as half of the American West is owned by 
the United States Government, the pursuit of public land wealth by private 
interests will be a dominant factor in national politics . . . .”); see also Huff-
man, Public Lands: The Case for Privatization, NRLI News, Winter 1995, at 
10–11 (“[G]overnment planners are unable to regulate an economy consisting 
of millions of individual actors and billions of individual decisions. The em-
pirical evidence of government failure is legion . . . . The history of public lands 
privatization, in one form or another, is based on the prem-
ise that conscientious agency implementation of statutes and 
official plans—whether enforceable by agencies or citizens—
is not possible within the political context in which we cur-
rently live.
Over the years, since the Goldwater debacle of the 1960s, 
a conservative resurgence has inexorably mounted, guided by 
the Powell Memorandum and richly funded by an array of 
right-wing foundations, many from the fossil-fuel sector.139 
This insider initiative from the beginning targeted environ-
mental protection law and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, and has continually fought to oppose active citizen 
participation in the enforcement of federal law generally.140 In 
effect, the current political scene reflects a continuing battle 
between the multicentric pluralist tendencies inherited from 
the 1960s and strong establishment pressures to return to 
the dipolar structure of governance, inviting what Acemoglu 
and Robinson describe as the stagnation and entropy conse-
quence of having “extractive élites” as dominant societal play-
management failures gives us reason to explore . . . private ownership.”). For its 
part, the libertarian Thoreau Institute states,
In the past thirty years, the Thoreau Institute has critiqued well over 
one hundred forest plans, park plans, transportation plans, and urban 
plans. We have consistently found that the plans are flawed, and when 
implemented they produce disastrous results. The problem is with the 
idea of planning itself. Our new web log, The Antiplanner, promotes 
the repeal of federal and state planning laws and the closure of state 
and local planning departments.
 The Electronic Drummer, Thoreau Inst., http://www.ti.org (last updated Dec. 
31, 2006).
139. See Plater, supra note 125, at 38. In 1971, shortly before he was appointed to 
the Supreme Court, Judge Lewis Powell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit was asked by his neighbor, a high-ranking executive in the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, to write a memorandum for the Chamber on how 
America’s industrial establishment could beat back the progressive policies that 
had taken over the nation. See Plater et al., supra note 88, at 406. Powell pro-
duced a punchy diagnosis and prescription: “Business and the free enterprise 
system are in deep trouble, and the hour is late.” The Powell Memo, Reclaim 
Democracy, http://reclaimdemocracy.org/powell_memo_lewis/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2015). The marketplace was facing, Judge Powell said, a “socialistic” 
popular clamor for civil rights, environmental regulation, labor rights, con-
sumer protection, and attempts to roll back the military-industrial complex:
The time has come - indeed, it is long overdue - for the wisdom, in-
genuity and resources of American business to be marshaled against 
those who would destroy it . . . . Strength lies in organization, in care-
ful long-range planning and implementation, in consistency of action 
over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of financing available 
only through joint effort, and in the political power available only 
through united action and national organizations.
 Id. Heeding Lewis Powell’s call, industry started aggregating financial resources 
and, led by the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, launched a complex and coordinated long term counterattack. 
They created a sophisticated network of Washington political strategists, me-
dia specialists, and lobbyists selectively distributing bundles of campaign con-
tributions to legislators. They set up the Heritage Foundation, a probusiness 
institute dedicated to producing academically credentialed studies and reports 
that supported antiregulatory policy arguments, and re-energized the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute. With grants and other emoluments they cultivated 
a cadre of law school and other acquiescent academics that could be counted 
on to bring the promarketplace message to the universities. They founded and 
lavishly funded “conservative” clubs on many campuses, and Federalist Society 
chapters at virtually all the nation’s law schools. They set up the Pacific Legal 
Foundation (“PLF”) and a dozen similar clones of PLF as self-described “pub-
lic interest law firms” committed to representing a wide variety of industry 
positions against public interest laws and initiatives. Guided by the Powell 
Memorandum, this industry-neocon politico-cultural effort launched in 1971 
has changed the face of American politics.
140. Plater, supra note 125, at 50–51, 57–58.
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ers.141 Justice Scalia’s opinion in SUWA illustrates how the 
same political constraints that press heavily upon the internal 
operations of resource management agencies can be echoed in 
judicial agendas pushing for a return to the old dipolar stasis, 
deferring to agency accommodations with market forces and 
restricting the abilities of citizens to enforce laws.
What explains the difference in seriousness of planning and 
its implementation between the NULPA and CZMA layered 
planning model and the more familiar federal agency resource 
management model? There appears to be a sharp contrast. In 
part, of course, the stringent planning compliance of CZMA 
reflects the fact that it is driven by substantial financial grants 
keyed to objective implementation of the planning process.142 
In part, it also adds much to the attractive political partner-
ship between federal and state authorities that lies at its core; 
unlike federal resource agencies, the CZMA program is politi-
cally buffered from development pressures by state political 
buy-in to its regulatory mission. Much of the overall distinc-
tion, however, can probably be attributed to the specificity 
that is statutorily required of plans, the statutory insistence 
that they be adhered to, and the checks and balances built into 
the state-federal interaction and OCRM’s openness to citizen 
enforcement suggestions, maintaining a sense of administra-
tive vigilance and a presumption of plan compliance. Those 
qualities are too often undercut in the political context of the 
federal resource management agencies.
V. Conclusion
The history of resource management planning and imple-
mentation in the United States continues to be a revealing 
exemplar of the evolving structure of the nation’s governance 
structure. The layered model of federally mandated planning 
in NLUPA and CZMA offers an innovative framework for 
comprehensive rationalization of land use management deci-
sions—a framework resisted by the market forces that prefer 
80,000 fractionalized, uncoordinated local land programs, 
so that ultimately NLUPA was blocked from becoming law. 
CZMA, in practice, however, has been a successful exem-
plar of the layered model, though at a much decreased scale 
141. See generally D. Acemoglu & J. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins 
of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (2012). 
142. Perhaps the most successful federal planning program is the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) Water Quality Management Planning program, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 
(2012), focused on wastewater. Federal funding encourages states to plan with 
regional and local units to build and maintain sewerage facilities and monitor 
impacted waters; the program has had a tangible effect on development pat-
terns. The planning required by the CWA is large-scale and relatively open-
ended in the management mandates it dictates.
from that of NLUPA. CZMA planning programs facilitate 
a balance between natural resource protection and human 
economic uses, as relevant today as it was at the inception 
of CZMA. Just as a contemporary NLUPA might well offer 
a substantial improvement upon today’s still-uncoordinated, 
local-based land use patterns, federal resource agency man-
agement could learn much from the specificity and enforce-
ability of the federally chartered CZMA program.
A plan is only as good as the data, standards, procedures, 
and good faith incorporated in its creation and implementa-
tion. Each element in turn can spawn multiple controversial 
questions and debates, which may ultimately lead to “once-
heralded programs [getting] lost or misdirected in vast hall-
ways or elsewhere.”143 Federal agencies exist within a political 
context where congressionally promulgated resource protec-
tion statutes, formed in a focused moment of public attention 
and resolve, declare public policies and occasionally impose 
stringent legal mandates in public recognition of “market 
failure”—that the private marketplace is in some particular 
respect failing to serve the public interest. There has been, 
however, a widespread failure of the traditional “dipolar” 
model of societal governance, which illustrates a pressing cur-
rent need for transparency and for the defense and evolution 
of the “multicentric” post-1960s pluralistic model of societal 
governance, with effective citizen participation and enforce-
ment in the process of federal land management planning.
One of the further lessons of this overview, therefore, is the 
importance of integrating citizen participation into resource 
agency operations, counteracting the tendency to return to 
the old dipolar, iron triangle-burdened governance model. 
If citizen involvement in federal resource agency manage-
ment is incapacitated due to agency obstruction and lack 
of judicial support, then the interests that will generally be 
reflected within agency processes will be those of the focused 
economic players invested in exploiting public resources for 
short-term gain, without regard for the long-term interests of 
the public and the conservation mandates of the law. As we 
often tell our students: scratch away at the surface of almost 
any environmental controversy, and pretty soon you’ll find 
yourself looking at deep questions of democratic governance.
143. Scalia, supra note 121, at 897.
